

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BRITISH FLEET'S WITHDRAWAL FROM PORT HAMILTON (KŎMUNDO) AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE LI-LADYGENSKY JOINT AGREEMENT OF 1886

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I. Introduction

On 28 April 1884, Britain and Korea exchanged ratifications for the Second British-Korean Treaty of Amity and Commerce (the 'Parkes' treaty). With this treaty's ratification, Britain and Korea created an official diplomatic channel and wrote clearly the first page of British-Korean diplomatic history. However, the Port Hamilton affair (May 1885–Feb 1887), in which the British navy occupied a Korean island group known as Kŏmundo (Port Hamilton to the British) seemed to undermine the meaning of the Parkes treaty. Several events connected with the occupation indicate that the British-Korean diplomatic link created by the treaty was ignored. Firstly, the British government occupied Port Hamilton without contacting the Korean government.¹ Secondly, the British government discussed the future of Port Hamilton with neighbouring countries such as Russia and China, while excluding Korea, the sovereign power.² Finally, the British withdrawal from Port Hamilton followed on from the Li-Ladygensky Joint Agreement (L-L Agreement—sometimes known as the Tianjin Agreement) of 1886, which resulted from Sino-Russian negotiations without involving Korea. The British government did not even discuss the practical arrangements for the evacuation of the islands with the Korean government.³

If the above accounts are accurate, do existing studies about the Port Hamilton affair fully deal with their meaning? Firstly, there are several existing studies that focus on linking the occupation to the 'Great Game' of the nineteenth century. Seo Jung-suk's article insists that the affair is related to the Great Game.⁴ Park Jun-kyu's article has clearer views about the Great Game. He mentions that Britain occupied Port Hamilton (PH) because of a secret agreement between Korea and Russia.⁵ Ch'oe Mun-hyong's article has similar views. Ch'oe says that suspicions of a secret agreement between Korea and Russia persuaded the British government to occupy PH to prevent Russian expansion in Korea. He also argues that while the PH occupation may have stopped Russian expansion into Korea, it increased Chinese intervention in

Korean domestic policies.⁶ Kim Yung-chung has a different view in her thesis. She insists that the British government did not know the terms of the secret agreement between Korea and Russia until PH had been occupied.⁷ Kim's view matches that of T. Dennett.⁸ In addition, Kim Hyun-soo insists in his thesis on the importance of the Great Game in the PH affair, since he has a view that it had a great influence on British diplomacy in imperial times.⁹

Secondly, several studies deal with the focus on the British Empire's economic relations. No Kyae-hyun's article argues that the PH affair is a British strategic arrangement to obtain a colony in East Asia.¹⁰ F. C. Jones, in his thesis, asserts that the PH occupation took place in order to protect British trade in China and Japan.¹¹ On the other hand, Kim Yung-chung said that the PH affair should be understood in relation to the Great Game, not to economics and trade. She adds that Britain's economic interest in Asia only related to India.¹²

Thirdly, Lee Yong-hee asserts that the Korean government tried to assert her sovereign power in relation to the PH affair.¹³ This interpretation indicates that Korea becomes the core of the great powers' Eastern Asian diplomacy because of the PH Affair.

In addition, there is a study that focuses on the British interest in Kōmundo itself. Katsmi's article tells that PH is already an area of interest to the British government before they decide to occupy the islands.¹⁴ Some historical materials including Parkes's interest in 1876 form the background of Katsmi's assertion.¹⁵ Lastly, Hoare introduces overall geographical, historical, and political views about Kōmundo.¹⁶

In fact, while checking existing studies, I found that most articles tell about the occupation of PH, but I can find little about the withdrawal. Therefore, in this paper, I will deal with British foreign policy relating to the PH withdrawal, and in particular, with the L-L Agreement which was at the core of it.

II. Background of the L-L Agreement

By analysis of existing studies about the Port Hamilton Affair, it is clear that the Great Game is the background to both the occupation of and withdrawal from Port Hamilton. Therefore, understanding the Great Game is the first step in analyzing the withdrawal from Port Hamilton.

What was the cause of the Great Game? First of all, it should be understood both from the point of view of George Canning's ideas (Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, 1807–27) and Viscount Palmerston's activities (Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, 1830–51). Canning had 'non-interference' and 'neutrality' as the core ideas of his foreign policy. In the case of non-interference, he focused on 'isolation diplomacy', which meant that Britain would not have an alliance with any European power because he did not want to interfere in the movement for independence of

weak countries.¹⁷ When other powers tried to block developments in the weak countries, however, Canning had a principle of trying to work for a balance between the powers and the weak countries. This was called 'neutrality'.¹⁸ Therefore, in the case of neutrality, Canning's idea was developed in a dual concept which included both non-interference and interference.

What were Viscount Palmerston's diplomatic activities? In the first Reform Act (1832), which led to the reform of the House of Commons, the British middle classes got increased political power in parliament. After getting political power, the middle classes endeavoured to preserve and protect their position by expanding their economic power. Palmerston, Foreign Secretary in a Whig government, thought that the middle classes' political power could both maintain the liberty of Britain and give legitimacy to his party. Therefore, he set out some diplomatic principles that were concerned with trade because he understood that expanding economic power was closely related to trade activity. Firstly, he wanted a policy of free trade with all nations without being tied down with alliances. That was 'isolation policy'. Secondly, if a nation disturbed British trade activities, Palmerston would intervene in that country; this was his 'pan-intervention policy'. Thirdly, in order to protect sea routes for trade, he reinforced British naval power; this was the 'navy reinforcement policy'.¹⁹

On the other hand, Russia, which lay outside the nineteenth-century European revolutionary tradition, must also be examined in order to understand the causes of the Great Game. In order to prevent the spread of European revolutionary thinking to Russian society, the Russian Czars thought that their power could be strengthened by an active trade policy. For this, Russia needed to obtain ice-free ports in order to ensure all-year-round trade.²⁰ This was a major and continuous principle of Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth century, when Russia sought ice-free ports in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean. Under the above-mentioned circumstances, Britain and Russia pursued their separate foreign policies in order to maintain the middle classes' power on the one hand, and Czarist power on the other. However, when regions in which they were interested in trade overlapped, they might find themselves struggling with each other.²¹ That is the simple meaning of the Great Game.

In order to analyze the significance of the withdrawal from Port Hamilton, it is also necessary to understand how the occupation came about. On 1 March 1885, Russian forces seized Afghan territory south of the Oxus River around an oasis at Panjdeh. At the time, Afghan forces were encamped on the west bank of the Kushk River, with a Russian force on the east bank.²² On 30 March, the Russians attacked the Afghan forces and drove them across the Pul-i-Khishti Bridge with a loss of some 40 men. Afghan troops were reported to have been 'wiped out to a man' in their trenches, with losses of up to 600.²³ The incident raised the possibility of a British-

Russian struggle within the sphere of the Great Game. Prime Minister Gladstone drew on public Russophobia (anti-Russian sentiment), which covered a wide spectrum of prejudices, dislikes or fears of Russia, Russians, and Russian culture. In a speech to parliament in early April, he said, that “In order to protect British India, we need to defend the Afghan border. For our prestige and faith, we should fight with Russia”.²⁴ Russia also expressed her position through the journal *Ruski Vedomosti*, which wrote about the Panjdeh incident that “It is impossible to keep peace with England. We should escalate the War”.²⁵ Thus, rather than seeking a diplomatic compromise, both countries adopted a warlike and confrontational approach.

Before going to war, the Gladstone cabinet wanted a preliminary assessment of Russian expansion. In the Mediterranean area, Britain had the possibility of legal intervention against Russia because Russian expansion was limited by international agreements such as the London Straits Convention of 1841, the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and the Congress of Berlin of 1878. In the case of the Indian Ocean area, Britain could check Russian movement because of its sovereignty over India. But the Pacific area was different. While Britain had Hong Kong, this related to China, not Russia. If Russia expanded through Vladivostok, Britain did not have the possibility of a legal intervention against such a move because there was no relevant international law to prevent it and the Pacific area was a blind spot in British defence strategy. Therefore, Britain might need to make a reason for intervention in this area.

The British government thus developed the scenario that Russia was looking for an outpost via Vladivostok to expand her power to East Asia.²⁶ Then the Navy Committee suggested the possibility of PH occupation to the government because PH, 300 miles from Shanghai, 160 miles from Nagasaki, and 100 miles from Pusan, was the best strategic outpost linking British open ports in East Asia.²⁷ The government’s response to this suggestion was positive and came from the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Northbrook, who said in a memorandum that “If Britain does not get it, Russia will get it”.²⁸ Therefore, it is clear that the decision to occupy Port Hamilton was part of the proceedings of the Great Game.

On 10 May 1885, Port Hamilton was occupied by three ships of the Royal Navy on orders from the Admiralty.²⁹ At the time, China, Japan, and even the United States feared Russian expansion into East Asia because of the terms of ‘a Secret Agreement between Korea and Russia’ (한로밀약 韓露密約).³⁰ So, even though these countries complained that the British move was outside international law, they did not press the issue because they hoped to use Britain to control Russia, thus giving Britain tacit permission to continue.³¹ In the circumstances, perhaps, Britain thought that the Port Hamilton occupation was a diplomatic victory because she had now prevented Russian expansion towards ice-free ports in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.

In order to understand the decision to withdraw from Port Hamilton, one must

examine the link between the withdrawal and developments in the Great Game. In September 1885, by terminating the Afghan crisis, the British government lost the basis for continuing the PH occupation. Now the British government was faced with the problem of how to control Russian movement in East Asia. First of all, Britain considered taking legal possession of PH, and made contact with the Korean government and raised the possibility of purchasing, renting, or leasing the territory, but without success.³² By then, Britain was ready to withdraw from PH, and wanted to get the best strategic advantage from leaving the islands. That is the reason why Britain spent a year and five months from the settlement of the Panjdeh crisis of 1885 before withdrawing from PH.

In April 1886, Lord Rosebery, the Foreign Secretary, expressed to China the British wish for a reasonable PH withdrawal. Lord Rosebery said, 'If China gives a guarantee of no Russian movement toward Korea, Britain could withdraw from PH without hesitation.'³³ He also sought for arbitration by Li Hongzhang, the Viceroy of Zhili and Minister of Beiyang. This British approach was similar to that used at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, when Britain controlled Russian advance to the Mediterranean area using Bismarck's arbitration. Eventually, Viceroy Li accepted the British proposition, which fitted in with his policy of 'using barbarians to control barbarians (이이제이 以夷制夷)'. For example, Li had arbitrated the first British-Korean Amity & Commercial treaty of 1882 because he wanted to control Russian movement by using British power.³⁴ So, in case of PH, he believed that his arbitration could simultaneously solve both the problem of Russian expansion and that of the withdrawal of the British fleet. And he also thought that this would be an opportunity to keep Korea under Chinese influence.

After Viceroy Li accepted Britain's proposition, he firstly contacted the Russian minister to China, Count de Ladygensky, seeking the Russia government's agreement.³⁵ Having received a positive reply from the Russian government on 25 September 1886, he started negotiations with Russia to draw up an official document pledging 'no occupation'.³⁶ During the treaty negotiations, Li persuaded the Russian Government through Count de Ladygensky that the treaty could firstly achieve a complete British withdrawal from PH; secondly, would allow Russia to concentrate on East European problems such as the issue of Bulgarian independence³⁷; and thirdly, would help to limit Japanese ambition. With Russia's accepting Li's persuasion, the L-L Agreement was completed on 6 October 1886.³⁸ On 31 October, Li then sought British withdrawal from PH.³⁹

What did the British Government think of the L-L Agreement's position on withdrawal from PH? Was this a victory for British foreign policy in the Great Game? Was it the best way to avoid direct conflict with Russia in East Asia as part of the Great Game? The evidence is that the British Government seemed to accept L-L Agreement as a victory. On 24 November 1886 Britain announced a withdrawal from

PH to Korea's neighbouring countries, and it finally withdrew from the islands on 27 February 1887.

III. Evaluation of the L-L Agreement

1. Evaluation in the context of the Great Game

The British Prime Ministers who oversaw the PH withdrawal were Gladstone and Salisbury. In the case of Gladstone, he had considered the issue during his third period as Prime Minister (2 January-20 July 1886), because of the defusing of the Afghan crisis. In case of Salisbury, the withdrawal can be ascribed to him, since he began to discuss the question during his first premiership, and it was completed during his second (25 July 1886 -11 August 1892).

Temperley wrote that "Canning is the Statesman of Liberty, Palmerston is the Bagman of Liberty, and Gladstone is the Prophet of Liberty".⁴⁰ He meant that Gladstone followed a similar political line to Canning and Palmerston. But that Gladstone's foreign policy was slightly different from the others. His policy, which he called 'Moral policy', was based on 'Six Right Principles of Foreign Policy'.⁴¹ After his first premiership (1868-1874), he pursued his own style. Firstly, Gladstone thought that Palmerston's intervention policy was very costly.⁴² So, during his first premiership, he tried a policy of reducing army expenditure. But the policy failed because of Bismarck's appearance in the European political sphere. Secondly, Gladstone agonised over the decision to launch military operations during the Sudan Rebellion of 1885 because he thought that the Sudanese had rational reasons for their behaviour; but while he hesitated, General Gordon was murdered by Sudanese rioters, and this caused him serious political damage.⁴³ In these circumstances, it is understandable that he saw the beginning of the Afghan crisis of 1885 as a means of undoing some of the political damage he had suffered. Thus he followed Palmerston's intervention policy instead of his own.⁴⁴

On the other hand, during his third premiership (February 1886-July 1886), when he faced the issue of withdrawal from PH, he had no wish to maintain an interventionist policy because the Afghan crisis was settled in September 1885. Gladstone also wanted to concentrate on the Irish Home Rule bill. Therefore, he wanted a simple solution to the PH Affair without becoming entangled in the complications of the Great Game. It meant that for Gladstone, the L-L Agreement was not central to his policy.

What was Salisbury's diplomatic policy? His basic principle was to look at the 'realities behind diplomacy'.⁴⁵ In 1878, he had the leading role at the Congress of Berlin as Foreign Secretary. In 1887, he again had the leading role of in the Mediterranean Agreement as Prime Minister. Salisbury concentrated on controlling

Russian expansion through the use of international law. This was Salisbury's practical diplomacy. It means that he tried to keep Britain as a central player in constraining Russia by diplomatic intervention.

Of course, Salisbury's foreign policy, in the case of the L-L Agreement, was connected to the Great Game because it sought control of Russian expansion in East Asia. However, in the case of the L-L Agreement, there was no attempt to put Britain in a central position. The third clause of the L-L Agreement, which states that 'Russia and China pledge themselves to discuss any part of Korea's political circumstances together', is evidence that Britain was not central to the agreement. Does the L-L Agreement differ from the other cases where his principles prevailed? Salisbury considered that the protection of the Indian trade route was the main focus of British foreign policy to Asia.⁴⁶ And he also thought that keeping a good relationship between China and Britain meant protection for East Asian trade routes.⁴⁷ It meant that any political problems in Asia except India and China were of minor concern to him. So, in the case of the L-L Agreement, he thought that it would help in maintaining a good relationship with China, and would also help in controlling any form of Russian expansion, which fitted in with his own practical approach. Therefore, for Salisbury too, the L-L Agreement was not a central concern.

What is the final estimation of the PH withdrawal as it related to the Great Game? From the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894, China's diplomatic role in East Asia was weakened, while Russia pursued a strong policy with plans for Siberia railroad construction.⁴⁸ At the time, Britain could not directly oppose Russian expansion in East Asia. This was because Gladstone and Salisbury had not seen the crucial importance of the L-L Agreement to British interests and therefore Britain did not have a well thought out position for controlling East Asian Affairs. Therefore, it can be concluded that the effect of the L-L Agreement was not positive for Britain's role in the Great Game.

2. Evaluation in relation to British Foreign Policy in East Asia

The L-L Agreement indicates differences in British foreign policy in East Asia and in the Great Game. When assessing British Foreign Policy towards East Asia, it is necessary to examine Sir Harry S. Parkes' diplomatic activities since he served as a representative diplomat in East Asia for over 30 years.⁴⁹ When analyzing Parkes' approach to foreign policy, some principles are evident: firstly, he sought to increase economic profits for Britain; secondly, in order to eliminate intervention by surrounding countries in a country in which Britain had interests, he would try to conclude a clear treaty with that country; and thirdly, in order that Britain might have a basis for its own intervention to a country of direct interest, he would also try to conclude a clear treaty. Thus it can be concluded that Parkes' diplomatic principles

are very similar to those of Palmerston. This is not surprising since the origin of Parkes' principles came from meeting with Palmerston in London in 1849, and Parkes thereafter regarded Palmerston as his mentor.⁵⁰

How did these principles operate in East Asian countries? In the first place, how did his principles emerge in China? In the 1850s, Ye Mingchen, Guangzhou commissioner of China, tried to stop foreigners' residence in Guangzhou, breaching the 1842 Nanjing Treaty. In October 1856, Ye sparked off the 'Arrow incident'. The *Arrow* was a Chinese-owned ship (a lorcha) that had been registered in Hong Kong, which placed it under British protection. During the incident, Chinese subjects on the *Arrow* were arrested and imprisoned, and Chinese soldiers insulted the British flag that *Arrow* had been flying.⁵¹ Parkes, British consul in Guangzhou, complained at the connivance of the Chinese Government in this breach of the Nanjing Treaty, and insisted that Britain needed a mission and should establish a British legation in Beijing to prevent such breaches (principle 1).⁵² When faced with the *Arrow* incident, he thought that it was an opportunity to remedy the defects of the Nanjing Treaty (principles 2, 3). The British Government therefore tried to revise the Nanjing Treaty on the basis of the *Arrow* incident. But because of tepid attitude of the Chinese Government, the British Government entered the second Opium war.⁵³ Parkes was an avid supporter of the war, especially when he experienced a period of imprisonment by the Chinese. The 1860 Treaty of Beijing, which brought the war to a conclusion, became the basic framework of Western foreign policy towards East Asian countries.⁵⁴ Under its terms, Parkes achieved his hope of establishing a British legation in Beijing to prevent treaty breaches (principle 1), having used the *Arrow* incident as the opportunity to revise the Nanjing Treaty (principles 2, 3).

Next, how did he apply his principles to Japan? Firstly, after being appointed the British minister to Japan in 1865, he concluded the treaty of 1866 (개세약서 改稅約書) in order to amend the Ansei Five-Power Treaties of 1858. At the time, Parkes played the role of overall representative of the Great Powers. During the period of negotiation, he did remarkable diplomatic work, presenting a united front of western diplomats negotiating with the Japanese Government for revision of the Ansei Treaty, using 'gunboat diplomacy' for negotiation, and persuading hitherto anti-foreign Daimyo to abandon resistance to Western Powers.⁵⁵ In this, he followed principles 2 and 3 of his foreign policy. Secondly, when the Iwakura mission visited the United Kingdom on its diplomatic and investigative tour in 1872, he was their escort, and encouraged them in their commercial observation of the whole country. Why did he escort the Iwakura mission? He believed that if the Japanese copied British industry, this would lead to active trade exchanges between Britain and Japan. Then, he also thought that this would help expand British influence in Japan because of converging economic interests: this was linked to principle 1 of his foreign policy.⁵⁶

Lastly, how did he manage his diplomatic ideas with regard to Korea? The first

British-Korean Treaty of Amity and Commerce of May 1882 (the Willis Treaty) was regarded as imperfect by the British government and never ratified. Under Parkes' leadership, this treaty was replaced by the November 1883 British-Korean Treaty (the Parkes Treaty), which was ratified in 1884. In this treaty, Parkes obtained a profitable tariff for Britain (principle 1). He also created an independent relationship between Korea and Britain without China's assistance (principles 2 and 3), because while the Korean government hoped to be recognized internationally as a sovereign power, Parkes expected to increase British influence and to reduce interference from other powers surrounding Korea.⁵⁷

How far did the PH affair occupation relate to Parkes' principles? Despite the Parkes Treaty, with its promise of amity, the PH affair, with the direct occupation of the islands, was more like a hostile act. The British Government did not abide by Parkes' principles. On the contrary, the Korean Government tried to keep to them when Kim Yun-sik, the Foreign Secretary, demanded British withdrawal under the terms of article 8 of the Treaty, which referred to the control of British ships within Korean ports.⁵⁸ However, Britain herself seemed to realize that she had broken the principle. The British government first sought for an understanding of the occupation as a response to fear of possible conflict.⁵⁹ Then, Britain offered to purchase or rent the islands from the Korean Government.⁶⁰ Thus, diplomatic principles did not entirely collapse during the occupation of PH.

What then was the relationship between the withdrawal from PH and Parkes' principles? Once the Afghan crisis had passed, the PH Affair remained as a diplomatic problem only between Korea and Britain. But in diplomatic terms, Britain excluded Korea from the PH Affair. She was only concerned with the question of Russian expansion into East Asia, and tried to solve the problem of PH withdrawal with China through the L-L Agreement. Furthermore, when Britain decided to withdraw from PH after the L-L Agreement, she carried out the withdrawal without reference to the Korean government.⁶¹ Now, it is clear that the exclusion of the Korean government from the issue of the PH withdrawal was a major issue in international law. As it was, the Parkes treaty was completely ignored, and Korea and Britain abandoned Parkes' diplomatic principles.

Why did this happen? One reason was the death of Parkes on 22 March 1885.⁶² He was no longer there to insist on his diplomatic principles during the PH Affair. Instead of being able to consult Parkes, the British government used the Griffis' book *Corea: the Hermit Nation* for information of Korea in June 1885.⁶³ In Asia, British foreign policy had two strands. One was an economic policy, to benefit from oversea markets, the other the strategic policy of protecting its trade routes from Russian expansion in the Great Game. After Parkes' death, no British diplomatic agents in the East Asia followed his diplomatic way. Why? The British government pursued its diplomatic policy in a strategic manner. This is second reason why Parkes treaty' was

ignored. In a confidential letter to the Korean government, Nicholas O'Connor, British chargé d'affaires in Beijing, expressed his displeasure at its assertion that the PH occupation contravened international law as set out in article 1 of the Parkes Treaty.⁶⁴ This indicates that O'Connor did not understand Parkes' economic concept at all.

What is the final estimation of PH withdrawal in relation to the British foreign policy towards East Asia? The L-L Agreement cannot be judged positive because it led to the resumption of Li Hongzhang's intervention in Korea affairs. When concluding the 1883 British-Korean Treaty, Parkes had tried to limit Li's role in East Asian diplomacy. But during the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War, Li seriously interfered in Korean domestic and external politics against the Japanese advance. If Britain had maintained its 1883 treaty, it could have intervened during the war in order to preserve British interests in Korea. But Britain actually played no role.

Moreover, it became clear in the Sino-Japanese War that because of the disappearance of the Parkes Treaty and the acceptance of the L-L Agreement, Korea seemed not to be a sovereign nation. On 1 June 1894, the Tonghak (anti-Western group) Rebel Army moved towards Seoul. The Korean government requested Chinese government support to suppress the rebellion. On 6 June 1894, under the terms of the April 1885 Convention of Tianjin (Tientsin), the Chinese government informed the Japanese government of its military operation. About 2,465 Chinese soldiers were transported to Korea within days. Then, on 8 June 1894, the first of around 4,000 Japanese soldiers and 500 marines landed at Jemulpo (Incheon), despite Korean and Chinese protests. Additional Japanese troops arrived in Korea on 22 June 1894. Japan thus broke the Convention of Tianjin. On 23 July 1894, Japanese troops entered Seoul, seized the Korean King and established a new pro-Japanese government, which terminated all Sino-Korean treaties and granted the Imperial Japanese Army the right to expel the Chinese Beiyang Army troops from Korea.⁶⁵ These actions proved that Korea was not a sovereign nation, a direct consequence of the conclusion of the L-L Agreement.

IV. Conclusion

The research focus of this paper is the evaluation of the L-L Agreement in the context of the Great Game (i.e. Anglo-Russian rivalry) and British foreign policy to East Asia. In the case of the former, the L-L Agreement is positively evaluated because the British government succeeded in interrupting Russian expansion toward East Asia without direct conflict. And in the latter, the L-L Agreement can also be evaluated positively because it gave Britain a good reason for withdrawing from Port Hamilton. However, this paper tries to look at the issues from a different perspective.

Two negative aspects of the L-L Agreement have been identified: firstly, it failed to control Russian expansion in East Asia. By the L-L Agreement, China alone

undertook the task of stopping Russian expansion toward East Asia. After the first Sino-Japanese War, however, China's diplomatic role in East Asia was weakened. By then no country, not even Britain, could control the Russian drive towards East Asia as represented by the planning for Siberia railroad construction. To stop this kind of Russian expansion, Britain arranged the 1902 Alliance with Japan, the victor in the Sino-Japanese War. This shows that Britain, as a result of the L-L Agreement, could not become the victor in the Great Game in East Asia.

The second negative evaluation of the Agreement relates to British foreign policy towards East Asia. Through the conclusion of the 1883 treaty, Sir Harry Parkes prevented Li Hongzhang from intervening in Korea. But the effect of Parkes' treaty was overturned by the L-L Agreement because Li resumed his intervention in Korea. And, by accepting the L-L Agreement, Britain herself gave up recognition of Korean sovereignty. Therefore, the major principles of British foreign policy in East Asia which were formed by Parkes were thrown into confusion, as was shown during Sino-Japanese War. Following this British example, China and Japan did not treat Korea as a sovereign nation during the process of the war. Moreover, if Britain had kept to the principles behind Parkes' treaty, she could have arbitrated between China and Japan in order to preserve British interests in Korea, and war might have been avoided. Consequently, it is safe to say that Britain's abandonment of the recognition of Korean sovereignty led to the outbreak of the war.

In conclusion, the British government may have thought that withdrawal from Port Hamilton was a tiny incident because the Port Hamilton occupation itself was a side issue of the Great Game. However, this paper argues that the issue of withdrawal from Port Hamilton and especially the way withdrawal was brought about through the L-L Agreement offers important evidence for the understanding of main British foreign policy of the nineteenth century.

Notes

- 1 Vice-Admiral Sir W. Dowell to the Secretary to the Admiralty, No. 15, 18 May, 1885; China No. 1 (1887): *Correspondence respecting the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton by Her Majesty's Government*, Great Britain. Foreign Office (London: HMSO, 1887), p.5.
- 2 Earl Granville to Marquis Cheng, No. 5, 16 April, 1885; *ibid.*, pp. 1–2.
- 3 *Ibid.*, pp. 24–41.
- 4 Joongseok Seo, 'Kōmundo Sageon gwa kukjaegwankyei yun'gu', *Jungoehakbo*, Vol.1 (KyungHee University, 1957).
- 5 Jun-kyu Park, 'Kōmundo Sageon ui kukjaejeongchi wooi', *Hanbando kukjaejeongchisa* (Korea: Seoul National University, 1984)

- 6 Mun-hyong Ch'oe, *Chegukchuui sidae ui yolang Kwa Han'guk* (Seoul: Minumsa, 1990), pp. 15–43.
- 7 Yung Chung Kim, *Great Britain and Korea, 1883–1887* (unpublished PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1964), pp.137–42.
- 8 T. Dennett, *Americans in East Asia* (New York, 1922) p. 91.
- 9 Hyun-soo Kim, *The Port Hamilton Affair and Russo-British Rivalry in the Far East, 1876–1905* (unpublished PhD dissertation, Glasgow University, 1989).
- 10 Kye-hyon No, *Han'guk oegyosa ron* (Daewangsa, 1984).
- 11 F. C. Jones, *Foreign Diplomacy, 1866–1894*, (unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1935).
- 12 Kim, *Great Britain and Korea, 1883–1887*, pp. 215–6.
- 13 Yonghee Lee, 'Kōmundo jumryung oegyojongko', *Lee Sangbaek Baksa Hoegapnonchong* (Ulryu munhwasa, 1964).
- 14 Watanabe Kazumi (渡邊勝美), *Kōmundo oegyosa, Bojeonhakhoe*, Vol. 1, (1934); trans. Hankuk Gundaesa nonjojim, vol. 2 (Taehaksa, 1982), pp. 361–419.
- 15 F.O. 405/15, No.127. Parkes to Salisbury, November 11, 1878; Jones, *Foreign Diplomacy in Korea, 1866–1894*, pp. 156–64.
- 16 J. E. Hoare, 'Kōmundo–Port Hamilton', *Asian Affairs*, vol. 17 no. 3, 1986, pp. 298–308.
- 17 H. W. V. Temperley, *Life of Canning* (London: James Pinch & Co, 1905), p. 270.
- 18 *Ibid*, p. 274.
- 19 *Ibid*, p. 276.
- 20 Cyrus C. Adams, 'Russia's Ice-free Port', *The New York Times*, 27 February, 1916.
- 21 See C. V. Doren, *The Life of Thomas Love Peacock* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd, 1911), pp. 214, 214–6, 218–21; 'Negotiations with the Russian Government for the Demarcation of the Boundary of Afghanistan since the annexation of Merv' (Doc. 10), *British Documents on Foreign Affairs; Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, ed. D Gillard, vol.12 (University Publications of America, 1985), p. 12.
- 22 ed. D Gillard, *ibid*.
- 23 Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, House of Commons, 9 April 1885, pp. 863–5; see also R. L. Greaves, *Persia and the Defence of India, 1884–92* (London, 1959), p.72.
- 24 *Ibid*.
- 25 Memorandum by Michell on the opinions of the Russia press, 22 April 1885, Doc. 50; *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, vol. 12, pp. 176–77.
- 26 The Secretary to the Admiralty to Currie, F. O. 405/35, No. 2; see also 'Russia's "Ice-Free Port"', *The New York Times*, 14 November 1903.
- 27 Extract from Report of Royal Commission on Defence of British Possessions, 20 May 1885, F. O. 405/35, Enclosure, and No. 29.
- 28 Memorandum by Northbrook, 20 May, 1885, F. O. 405/35, No. 29.
- 29 Captain Maclear to Dowell, 11 May 1885, F.O. 405/35, Inclosure 2 in No. 68.

- 30 *The first trial*: (1) Some members of the Korean Mission made contact with the governor-general of Vladivostok (1884.12)—it failed. (2) Möllendorf asked the Russian minister in Japan to dispatch training instructor (1885.2)—it failed. (Result) Möllendorf, who had been recommended by Li Hongzhang, resigned his position as Officer of Korean Customs. *The second trial*: Karl Ivanovich Weber, Russian acting minister who served in Korea, contacted the Korean king, suggesting that Russia should protect Korea (1885.11)—but his proposal failed because of Chinese government intervention. The result was that Chinese intervention in Korean domestic policies was strengthened.
- 31 Kyung-chang Kim, *Donyang oegyosa* (Seoul: Jipmundang, 1995), pp. 358–9.
- 32 The Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. O'Connor, no. 32; *ibid.* p. 9.
- 33 F.O. 405/36, Memorandum of proposed Answer to the Communication made by Sir H. Macartney on the 11th March with regard to Port Hamilton, Enclosure in no. 23; see F.O. 405/36, Sir P. Currie to Sir H. Macartney, no. 23, and April 14, 1886; see also F.O. 405/36, the Earl of Rosebery to Mr. O'Connor, no. 26, and 30 April, 1886.
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- 35 F.O. 405/36, Sir J. Walsham to the Earl of Iddesleigh, no. 91, 6 October, 1886.
- 36 Watanabe Kazumi, *Kōmundo oegyosa*, p. 41.
- 37 G.D. Clayton, *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli*, (London University, LION Library, 1971), pp. 180–2.
- 38 I: Russia and China pledge themselves to respect the integrity of Korea. II: Russia and China pledge themselves to protect Korea against encroachment at the hands of other powers. III: Russia and China pledge themselves to discuss any part of Korea's political circumstances together; R.S. Gundry, *op. cit.*, p. 287; Angus Hamilton, *Korea*, (London, William Heinemann 1904), p. 201.
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- 40 Temperley, *Life of Canning*, p. 276.
- 41 The 'Six Right Principles of Foreign Policy' were (1) To foster the strength of the Empire by just legislation and economy at home and to reserve the use of strength for great and worthy occasions abroad; (2) To defend the cause of peace; (3) To strive to cultivate and maintain the Concert for Europe; (4) To avoid needless and entangling engagements (with the emphasis on selective intervention); (5) To acknowledge the equal rights of all nations; and (6) To ensure that the foreign policy of England should be inspired always by the love of Freedom.
- 42 Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston* (London: Constable, 1970), p. 563.
- 43 Edmond George Petty Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville, K.G., 1815–1891*, vol. 2, (London: Longman, 1905), pp. 379–406.
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- 45 Lord Blake and Hugh Cecil, eds, *Salisbury: The Man and his Policies* (London: Macmillan, 1987), vii, pp. 148–84.

- 46 Keith M Wilson, ed, *British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy* (London: Crook Helm, 1987), pp. 119–37.
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Chinese loans from England (1881–1885)

Year	Cost	Interest Rate
1881	£1,096,000	8%
1883	£500,000	9%
1884(1)	£285,000	9%
1884(2)	£1,500,000	10%
1885(1)	£500,000	10%
1885(2)	£250,000	10%
1885(3)	£750,000	9%
1885(4)	Tls 4,000,000 (£1,088,500)	9%

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- 53 Bonner-Smith & Lumby, 'The Second China War', p. 390.
- 54 W. V. Costin, *Great Britain and China* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), pp. 341–2.
- 55 Hyun-soo Kim, 'Minister Harry S. Parkes and His Diplomacy in Japan, 1865–68', *Yöngkuk Yöнку*, No. 17 (the Korean Society for British History, 2004), pp. 324–30.
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- 58 *Gu-han'guk oegyo munseo* vol. 13 (Youngan vol. 1), no. 207, pp. 156–57.
- 59 *Gu-hankuk oegyo munseo* vol. 13 (Youngan vol. 1), no. 248, pp. 147–48.
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- 61 *Gu-han'guk oegyo munseo* vol. 13 (Youngan vol. 1), pp. 223–4.
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- 63 William Elliot Griffis, *Corea: the Hermit Nation* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882); see also Yong-bok Shin, *Unja ui Nara* (Jipmundang, 1999) pp. 445–563.
- 64 *Gu-han'guk oegyo munseo* Vol. 13 (Youngan vol. 1), no. 248, pp. 147–8.
- 65 Kim, *Donyang oegyosa*, pp. 406–12.